Cameroon: Alleged Intelligence Abuses Amid Power Rivalries and Private Surveillance

Cameroon’s intelligence services are described as being marked by power rivalries, operational difficulties and the alleged use of sensitive information outside its official framework. Testimonies and investigative findings point to the circulation of surveillance data for private interests, while several networks are said to be seeking to influence the channels of information reaching the presidency.

These elements must be distinguished from facts established by the courts. They are based in part on sources, testimonies and mutual accusations. Some of the officials named reject the allegations made against them. Nevertheless, they highlight a central issue: when intelligence is perceived as an instrument of rivalry or pressure, its mission to protect the state and its citizens is weakened.

Competition for access to the head of state

Several officials and networks around President Paul Biya are portrayed as being engaged in a struggle for influence over the Directorate General for External Research (DGRE), which is responsible for foreign intelligence. Names mentioned include Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, secretary-general of the presidency of the Republic; Samuel Mvondo Ayolo, director of the Civil Cabinet; Oswald Baboke, deputy director of the Civil Cabinet; as well as people close to the presidency.

The issue would not lie solely in the administrative control of a service, but in the ability to shape the information received by the head of state. Conflicting reports can thus become instruments of power, with each camp seeking to impose its interpretation of a sensitive case.

Two cases are cited in particular to illustrate this competition: the attempted broadcast of documents presented as presidential decrees at the premises of the public radio and television broadcaster, and questions concerning discrepancies between gold production in Cameroon and officially declared exports. According to the reported information, different notes on these matters were said to have been sent to the presidency.

This information battle is part of a broader political context marked by the enduring weight of institutional and security networks. The history of relations between power, security and opposition remains a defining issue in the country, as recalled in this article on Paul Biya, the memory of war and the legacies of Françafrique.

The Léopold Maxime Eko Eko case and cross-accusations

Léopold Maxime Eko Eko headed the DGRE for more than ten years. His career lies at the heart of the tensions reported around Cameroonian intelligence. At the end of 2020, a plan to appoint him ambassador to Brazil was reportedly considered. He is said to have viewed it as an attempt to remove him from Yaoundé. The decree was ultimately not signed.

In the aftermath of this conflict, Léopold Maxime Eko Eko reportedly accused Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh of helping reduce the DGRE’s resources and of being behind manoeuvres directed against him. He is also said to have submitted a report implicating the secretary-general of the presidency in the management of funds linked to the fight against coronavirus.

Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh was summoned before the Special Criminal Court in this case, according to the reported information. He reportedly did not appear. An operation aimed at apprehending him was suspended after a confrontation with his guard. Léopold Maxime Eko Eko had then been tasked with investigating him.

In January 2023, the former head of the DGRE reportedly gave Paul Biya a report implicating Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh in a coup plot. Four days after this note reached the presidency, Léopold Maxime Eko Eko was arrested as part of the investigation into the murder of journalist Martinez Zogo. He has since been held in pretrial detention at Kondengui Central Prison.

The proximity of these events raises questions, but it does not, by itself, establish a causal link. Léopold Maxime Eko Eko sees this sequence as a manoeuvre directed against him; Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh disputes the accusations against him.

When surveillance data leaves official channels

By its nature, intelligence gathers confidential information. The problem arises when that information is used for personal, commercial or score-settling purposes. Several accounts refer to alleged leaks of data from telephone surveillance or tracking systems.

Justin Danwe, then the DGRE’s director of operations, is notably portrayed as having passed sensitive information to Modeste Mopa Fatoing, former director-general of taxes. He is also described as having maintained close ties with businessman Jean-Pierre Amougou Belinga. According to the reported information, surveillance material was allegedly used to strengthen relationships or exert pressure on officials, including beyond Cameroon’s borders.

Anonymized testimonies also describe alleged access to phone records and location data for 25,000 CFA francs in the context of a marital dispute. In another case, a businessman says he was warned that his communications were being monitored during a dispute involving a shipment. He says he then circulated false information by phone in order to direct inspections toward a competitor.

A journalist investigating a corruption case reportedly received precise information about his daily habits, including the time at which he turned off the light. Without an explicit threat, such a method may be interpreted as intimidation: it tells the targeted person that their movements and privacy no longer fully belong to them.

A surveillance network extending into everyday life

The Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) is also mentioned in these accounts. An agent officially working in the administration reportedly said that she operated under another identity for this service. Her mission was allegedly to identify posts by journalists, opposition figures or ordinary internet users, then write intelligence notes about their authors.

Under this logic, a critical Facebook post could lead to the opening of a file or to the identification of its author. This possibility raises a fundamental question about the boundary between security monitoring, tracking public opinion and political surveillance.

The recruitment of young informants is also said to be part of the system. A former student recounts being invited to a meeting presented as an association gathering, before realizing that it was an informal recruitment operation for neighbourhood surveillance assignments. Promises of public-sector jobs or stable income were reportedly made to attract volunteers.

People likely to pass on information would not necessarily present themselves as agents. They could work in the administration, business, catering or other sectors. This diffuse presence would facilitate access to targets, but would also make it difficult to identify the real limits of surveillance.

The precarious state of services as a factor in alleged abuses

According to several cited sources, the DGRE is said to have experienced significant material decline. A lack of resources reportedly led some agents to sell briefing notes or intelligence at low prices. In this context, confidential information risks becoming a commodity rather than a tool serving national security.

This situation would fuel a dangerous cycle: the less resourced and supervised a service is, the more its agents may be exposed to influence, patronage and private interests. The consequences do not concern only struggles between officials. They also affect citizens, journalists, civil servants, businesspeople and anyone who may become a target.

Debates about the Cameroonian state cannot be separated from certain historical continuities, especially those related to political repression and institutional construction after independence. This look back at the repression of the UPC and Cameroon’s independence helps place these issues within a longer history of relations between security, power and dissent.

Why intelligence oversight is a democratic issue

An intelligence service needs discretion to carry out certain prevention and security missions. But that requirement does not remove the need for legal and institutional oversight. The protection of communications, privacy and freedom of expression requires safeguards against the arbitrary use of surveillance tools.

When confidential information circulates among factions, administrative officials or economic actors, trust in institutions deteriorates. When citizens believe they may be monitored because of a post, a private dispute or professional activity, self-censorship can replace public debate.

The allegations concerning Cameroonian intelligence services therefore point less to a single case than to a structural issue: the need to clearly distinguish state security, political rivalries and private interests.

FAQ

What is the role of the DGRE in Cameroon?

The Directorate General for External Research, or DGRE, is presented as the service responsible for foreign intelligence. However, the reported information refers to its involvement in institutional rivalries and the alleged circulation of sensitive information within power networks.

Have the allegations of private surveillance been proven?

The cases mentioned are based on testimonies and investigative sources. They raise serious suspicions, but should not be confused with final court rulings or legally established facts in every situation.

Why are intelligence reports at the centre of these rivalries?

Because they can influence how the highest authorities assess a crisis, an official or a case. Conflicting reports give different networks the opportunity to defend opposing versions of the same events.