DRC: Joseph Kabila and the FRN, a Rebel Alliance With Heavy Historical Echoes

The political and security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is becoming more complex with the announcement of a new movement, the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), presented as being led by former president Joseph Kabila. Senior M23 officials attended the announcement, including Corneille Nangaa, a former official in the rebel movement’s political wing, who was named among the front’s vice-presidents.

The FRN says it intends to bring together forces, resources and means to end what it describes as the “tyranny” of Félix Tshisekedi’s administration, including through force. This position comes amid a protracted conflict in the east of the country, national political tensions and fragile negotiations involving several mediators.

Joseph Kabila’s entry into this configuration marks a notable shift: the former head of state led the DRC for 18 years, has direct experience of its institutions and, according to the reported information, retains political connections and potential support in different parts of the country.

The FRN, the M23 and a crisis that extends beyond eastern DRC

The M23 and its allies are described as controlling significant territories in eastern DRC, including the cities of Goma and Bukavu. Until now, the movement’s influence had mainly been associated with this border region. Joseph Kabila’s participation in the FRN could, however, give this dynamic a broader political reach beyond its eastern military base.

It would nevertheless be premature to conclude that this represents a nationwide shift. The DRC is a vast state, and control of territories in the east does not mean control of the entire country or its central institutions. But the presence of a former president in a coalition linked to an armed rebellion raises the political stakes of the conflict.

According to reported information, Joseph Kabila was sentenced to death in absentia by a Congolese military court in 2025, notably in connection with allegations of presumed support for the M23. He rejected these accusations. The proceedings also raised questions about their political motivations and respect for judicial safeguards.

From the 2019 political alliance to the split with Félix Tshisekedi

Joseph Kabila left the presidency after the 2018 election, officially won by Félix Tshisekedi. That election was contested. Electoral data cited by observers from the Catholic Church indicated that Martin Fayulu had received more votes. He challenged the results in court, which upheld Félix Tshisekedi’s victory.

Accusations of a political deal between Joseph Kabila and Félix Tshisekedi subsequently circulated. Corneille Nangaa in particular stated that an agreement had been reached before the results were announced. This claim fuelled the controversy without ending the debate over the election.

At the beginning of Félix Tshisekedi’s term, Joseph Kabila’s camp retained a strong presence in Parliament as well as considerable influence within the state apparatus. This political cohabitation, however, came to an end. From 2020 onward, Félix Tshisekedi built a new majority, replaced officials and gradually reduced the influence of his predecessor’s network.

The split worsened as the crisis in the east intensified. The Congolese authorities accused Joseph Kabila of supporting the M23; the former president denied this and, for his part, denounced authoritarianism and political persecution. These mutual accusations are now at the heart of the confrontation between the two camps.

The precedent of Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Mobutu’s fall

Joseph Kabila’s involvement inevitably recalls the path taken by his father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In 1996, he led a rebellion against Mobutu Sese Seko, then president of Zaire for more than three decades. Backed notably by Rwanda and Uganda, the coalition crossed the country within a few months.

In May 1997, Mobutu left power. Laurent-Désiré Kabila became president, and Zaire resumed the name Democratic Republic of the Congo. His rise to power took place in a regional context deeply shaken by the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the arrival in eastern Zaire of many refugees and armed groups.

Rwanda then considered that certain groups present east of the border posed a direct threat to its security. This security justification accompanied its support for the 1996 rebellion. But the alliance between Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his regional backers quickly broke down: he called for foreign troops to leave, before a new rebellion was launched against his government.

This conflict contributed to the Second Congo War, involving several African countries and causing a major humanitarian catastrophe. Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, after which Joseph Kabila succeeded him as president.

The historical parallel is therefore real, but it should not obscure the differences. In 1996, Laurent-Désiré Kabila led an offensive against a weakened and isolated Mobutu government. Today, Joseph Kabila is acting after having exercised power himself for nearly two decades, in a DRC facing different institutions, regional coalitions and balances of power.

Rwanda at the centre of accusations and multiple stakes

Rwanda remains a central actor in the current crisis. Kigali says its main concern is national security, particularly in the face of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), partly stemming from groups linked to those responsible for the 1994 genocide and regarded by Rwanda as a threat.

United Nations investigators have nevertheless documented Rwandan military support for the M23, including the involvement of Rwandan troops according to the evidence cited. Rwanda disputes these conclusions and stresses its security imperatives.

The crisis cannot be reduced to a single security-based interpretation. Eastern DRC has significant resources, including gold, tin and tantalum. Control of territories can also provide access to mining sites, trade routes and cross-border flows. Security, political competition and economic interests are therefore closely intertwined.

This connection between power, territories and institutions highlights why analysing African crises requires distinguishing between responsibilities, the accounts offered by different parties and state mechanisms. In this respect, questions surrounding power rivalries and security agencies can also be illuminated by state intelligence tensions and political rivalries in Cameroon, in a context that is naturally distinct from that of the DRC.

What impact on negotiations and the country’s stability?

Mediation efforts are being discussed between the DRC and Rwanda, while Qatar is conducting separate talks between the Congolese government and the M23. The emergence of the FRN further complicates these efforts: negotiating with a coalition that includes a former president sentenced in absentia by the authorities it is fighting presents an additional political and legal challenge.

The debate also concerns proposed constitutional changes attributed to the ruling coalition, which could allow Félix Tshisekedi to govern beyond his final term scheduled to end in 2028. For his opponents, these proposals fuel tensions; for the authorities, the accusations against them are part of a broader political confrontation. These institutional issues are decisive because they directly affect the rules governing the transfer of power.

Regional precedents show that the existence of elections, a Parliament or a constitutional text is not always enough to guarantee an effective balance of powers. How Eswatini’s institutions operate illustrates, in another national setting, the gap that can exist between formal institutions and the actual concentration of authority.

In the DRC, the human consequences remain central. For nearly thirty years, armed conflicts, external interventions and political rivalries have caused population displacement and severe insecurity for many communities. The country’s mineral wealth contrasts with the persistent hardships experienced by a large part of the population.

FAQ

What is the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation?

The Front for the Refoundation of the Nation, or FRN, is a new movement presented as being led by Joseph Kabila. It brings together political officials and figures associated with the M23, including Corneille Nangaa. Its stated aim is to end Félix Tshisekedi’s administration, including through force.

Why is Rwanda regularly mentioned in the conflict in the DRC?

Rwanda says it is acting in response to security concerns, particularly those related to the FDLR. UN investigators, for their part, have reported Rwandan support for the M23, which Kigali disputes. The stakes surrounding territorial control and mineral resources add to the complexity of this crisis.

Why is Joseph Kabila compared to his father?

Laurent-Désiré Kabila led a rebellion backed notably by Rwanda that overthrew Mobutu in 1997. Joseph Kabila is now associated with a rebel movement in a context in which Rwanda is once again accused of supporting forces fighting Kinshasa. The historical comparison is striking, but the contexts are not identical.