Coups d’État: Understanding the Mechanisms, Support Networks and the Trap of Instability

A coup d’état refers to the seizure, or attempted seizure, of power by force outside constitutional procedures. It may be carried out by part of the military, by political leaders backed by armed forces, or by groups seeking to neutralize the institutions in place. Its outcome does not depend solely on the force used: it also depends on the structure of the state, the strength of its institutions, the social context, and domestic and international reactions.

Since the end of the Second World War, more than a thousand attempted coups have reportedly been recorded around the world. Some failed quickly, while others led to prolonged regime changes. Bolivia is often cited among the countries most affected, with numerous successful coups, attempted coups and conspiracies since 1945. This repetition highlights a central phenomenon: political instability can become entrenched as a cycle.

Why are some states more vulnerable?

Coups d’état do not occur at random. They develop more easily when power is concentrated, contested or weakened. In a system where decisions largely rest with one person or a very small circle, removing this centre of command can destabilize the entire state apparatus.

Institutional geography also matters. When the main centres of political, administrative, military and media power are concentrated in a single capital, a crisis at the top can have very rapid effects. Conversely, the distribution of authority across several cities, administrations or territorial levels makes it more difficult for a single group to capture the state.

The strength of institutions remains the decisive factor, however. A government can be deeply unpopular without the constitutional order collapsing. Legislatures able to convene, an independent judiciary, an organized administration and civic mobilization can limit the effects of an attempted rupture. South Korea illustrates this institutional importance: after a period marked by several coups between 1960 and 1980, its democratic development strengthened the constitutional order’s capacity for resistance.

In 2024, President Yoon Suk-yeol’s attempt to impose martial law was blocked by the National Assembly, while protesters mobilized. He was then impeached and imprisoned, according to the information cited. This episode is a reminder that a crisis at the top does not automatically produce a regime change: the response of checks and balances and of society remains decisive.

The role of the military and security apparatus

In most coups d’état, control of the armed forces, or of a significant part of them, is a major issue. The military possesses the state’s coercive means and often occupies a particular position during periods of crisis. Yet an army never acts as a homogeneous bloc: hierarchical rivalries, diverging interests, institutional loyalties and political divisions can determine the fate of an attempt.

Regime changes by force also depend on the ability to impose a narrative of legitimacy. Those behind a coup frequently present their action as a response to corruption, insecurity, an economic crisis or the alleged powerlessness of civilian authorities. These arguments may resonate with a population worn down by everyday difficulties, without necessarily ensuring lasting stability.

The case of Mali, where President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was overthrown in August 2020 and a junta led by Assimi Goïta took power, also shows the importance of public support. Singer Salif Keïta supported the authorities that emerged from this regime change and became a special adviser to the head of state. Symbolic recognition from popular figures can contribute to the search for legitimacy, but it cannot replace either a solid institutional framework or lasting political consensus.

Foreign influences: between support and intervention

Coups d’état are regularly embedded in international power relations. During the Cold War, several powers directly or indirectly supported regime changes when their geopolitical, economic or military interests were at stake.

The overthrow of Gabonese President Léon M’ba in February 1964 is an example of the importance of outside support. After the president’s arrest and the establishment of a provisional government led by Jean-Hilaire Aubame, France intervened militarily and restored Léon M’ba to power. This episode highlights how a formally national government may remain dependent on foreign partners capable of altering the internal balance of power.

In Chile, Salvador Allende’s rise to power in the early 1970s provoked hostility from the United States. Washington sought to financially isolate the country and supported opponents of the government amid an economic and social crisis. On September 11, 1973, Augusto Pinochet led the coup that overthrew Allende. It is impossible to determine with certainty what would have happened without US actions, but they helped create an environment more favourable to the overthrow.

Such outside interventions are not limited to visible military support. They may take the form of financial backing, intelligence sharing, diplomatic pressure or economic isolation. Cameroon’s political history also shows how power relations inherited from the colonial period and independence can remain structuring forces. The repression of the UPC and independence under French influence are, in this respect, a major element of Cameroonian political and memorial debates.

Seizing power does not mean governing

Overthrowing a government does not resolve the underlying causes of a crisis. On the contrary, it can disrupt the administration, intensify conflicts, weaken the economy and fuel distrust of the state. New authorities generally seek to restore order, gain international recognition and convince the population that the rupture was necessary.

This phase is particularly risky. Trade unions, political parties, media outlets, citizen movements and public administrations may challenge the new order. In Bolivia, Alberto Natusch Busch seized power in a coup on November 1, 1979, before being forced to relinquish it only fifteen days later. Social mobilization and a general strike weighed heavily in this failure.

Authorities that come to power through a coup often promise a transition and a return to electoral order. The duration, terms and credibility of that transition then lie at the heart of tensions. In Burkina Faso, the extension of the transition is cited as one contemporary example of this issue. Beyond announcements, stability depends on the ability to restore accepted rules, protect public freedoms and make institutions accountable to the population.

The “coup trap”: a difficult cycle to break

The more coups a country experiences, the more the risk of new attempts may increase. Every forced overthrow normalizes the idea that power can be seized outside institutions. It weakens common rules, fuels rivalries and sets a precedent for other factions, including within the military apparatus.

This vicious circle does not affect leaders alone. Populations bear the consequences of uncertainty: disruption of political life, weakened public services, economic pressure, possible repression and difficulties in building lasting trust. Debates over the legacy of authoritarian regimes and postcolonial political structures therefore remain essential, as illustrated by the analysis of war memories and Françafrique in Cameroon.

FAQ

What distinguishes a coup d’état from a revolution?

A coup d’état generally rests on the action of a small group seeking to quickly control decision-making centres. A revolution, in principle, involves broader social mobilization and deeper political or social transformations, although the boundary between these concepts may be debated depending on the context.

Why do coups d’état recur in some countries?

This recurrence may be explained by weak institutions, divisions within the armed forces, the absence of political rules recognized by everyone, economic crises or the existence of precedents that normalize the use of force.

Is international support enough to establish a new regime for the long term?

No. Outside support can influence the balance of power, but it guarantees neither public acceptance, nor state cohesion, nor long-term stability. Domestic legitimacy and robust institutions remain decisive.